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Ç 
i ^ A L M A N R U S H D I E ' S The Satanic Verses ( 1 9 8 8 ) is one of the 
relatively few works of fiction to have made a significant and 
permanent impact outside the enclosed world of literature. De-
spite W. H . Auden's assertion that "poetry [by which he meant 
imaginative literature in general] makes nothing happen" 
( 2 4 2 ) , ' this novel has clearly made a number of things happen. It 
has led to the loss of over twenty lives. It made its author go into 
hiding from the Ayatollah Khomeini 's fatwa of 1 9 8 9 , where he 
has remained under government protection ever since. Above 
all, coinciding with the ending of the C o l d War, it has played a 
significant role in redefining the West's image of itself. The 
Other is no longer the threat of Communism, but that of Islamic 
fundamentalism—far more of a paper tiger than the very real 
nuclear menace offered by the USSR and its allies. The book was 
similarly used by Islamic clerics to reinforce their image of the US 
(and its Western allies) as the Great Satan—doubly ironical 
seeing what a fierce critic of American policy abroad Rushdie 
had shown himself to be in TheJaguar Smile: A Nicaraguan Journey 
( 1 9 8 7 ) . The Iranian President Khamene ' i told his followers, 
" The Satanic Verses . . . is no doubt one of the verses of the Great 
Satan" (Appignanesi 8 7 ) . In giving Rushdie's ironic title a literal 
reading (although itself figurative in another way) Khamene' i 
polit icized the novel irrevocably. The Ayatollah Khomein i justi-
fied his fatwa against Rushdie by similarly accusing h im and "the 
world devourers" (the West) of publishing The Satanic Verses as "a 
calculated move aimed at rooting out religion and religiousness, 
and above all, Islam and its clergy" (Appignanesi 9 0 ) . Consider-
ing that the clergy in Iran occupied the highest positions of 
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political power, it can be seen how threatening Rushdie's novel 
must have appeared to the leaders of an Islamic theocratic state. 
Whereas Western politicians have chosen to represent this 
conflict as a battle between democratic freedom of speech and 
autocratic censorship or even terrorism (the fatwa), Rushdie's 
ideological stance, both within the novel and in his numerous 
comments on its reception, is a great deal more complex and 
problematical. In an article written about responses to the book, 
"In G o o d Faith" ( 1 9 9 0 ) , Rushdie insists that he has "never seen 
this controversy as a struggle between Western freedoms and 
Eastern unfreedom." Instead, he asserts, his novel champions 
"doubts, uncertainties." "It dissents from the end of debate, of 
dispute, of dissent" (Imaginary Homelands 3 9 6 ) . In defending his 
right to defend all issues endlessly, to postpone closure indefi-
nitely, to oppose certainties of all kinds whether they originate in 
the East or the West, Rushdie is clearly positioning himself as a 
writer in a postmodern world where nothing can be asserted with 
assurance. "I am a modern, and modernist, urban man," he 
insists in the same essay, "accepting uncertainty as the only 
constant, change as the only sure thing" ( 4 0 4 - 0 5 ) . This refusal to 
countenance any of the grand narratives that have governed 
Eastern or Western civilization is precisely the stance that Jean-
François Lyotard identifies as central to the postmodern condi-
t ion. 2 Rushdie has been simultaneously hailed by many critics as 
the preeminent practitioner of postcolonial writing which is 
normally characterized by its opposition to the values and ideol-
ogy of the metropolitan centre. While postmodernism itself is 
said to embrace cultural relativity, it tends to prioritize relativity 
per se, whereas postcolonialism normally prioritizes non-Western 
cultural diversity. In other words there is an implici t conflict in 
the two positions: postcolonialism adopts specific political posi-
tions which postmodernism goes out of its way to relativize. 
Rushdie's own life history further complicates this dichotomy. 
Brought up a Mus l im in a H i n d u country, he was sent to an 
English public school at the age of fourteen, and chose to stay on 
in England after obtaining a degree in History at King's College, 
London . Self-exiled from his native country, he was repeatedly 
rebuffed by the inherent racism he met with in his adopted 
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country. Prior to the proclamation of the fatwa Rushdie was one 
of the acutest critics of the Thatcher regime's brand of racist 
politics. After he was placed in the care of the British security 
services, he found himself in the ambivalent position of an 
adopted citizen owing his life to a government that was simul-
taneously passing anti-immigrant legislation motivated by the 
fear of being swamped by alien races. Marginalized racially, 
Rushdie nevertheless belongs more to the centre of the domi-
nant culture when considered in terms of class and wealth. He 
has turned the hybridity of his migrant (as opposed to immi-
grant) status into a desirable i f uncomfortable mode of exis-
tence. It offers h im freedom from "the shackles of nationalism," 
but it is "a burdensome freedom" (Imaginary Homelands 1 2 4 ) . It 
means that writers in his position "are capable of writing from a 
kind of double perspective, because they, we, are at one and the 
same time insiders and outsiders in this society" ( 1 9 ) . As an 
insider, Rushdie is postmodern in his validation of uncertainty. 
As an outsider, he is postcolonialist in his satirical subversion of 
the certainties of metropolitan (Thatcherite) politics and the 
center's exercise of power. 
Rushdie attempts to reconcile these internal stresses by resort-
ing to a trope — that of oxymoron—by means of which he seeks 
to celebrate the certainty of uncertainty, the singular affirmation 
of plurality. Inevitably he has been taken to task by each camp for 
supposedly embracing the opposing one. In particular, he has 
come under sustained attack for his quintessentially postmodern 
attitude by Marxists, especially by Aijaz Ahmad. A h m a d attacks 
Rushdie on the grounds that his fictional space is "occupied so 
entirely by Power that there is no space left for either resistance 
or its representation" ( 1 2 7 ) . In Ahmad's eyes Rushdie lacks 
proper anti-imperialist political conviction. However, critics such 
as A h m a d embody a specific postcolonial interpretation of the 
political that is far too crude when applied to Rushdie's writings. 
Rushdie refuses to adopt any easy position in the postcolonial 
debate, because he stands on both sides of its divide. This enables 
h im to discern in both dominant and emergent cultures the 
same desire to appropriate the truth for themselves and to use 
this truth to valorize their imposition of it on believers and 
dissenters alike. 
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Despite Rushdie's later protestations, there is no doubt that he 
set out in this novel to confront what he disparagingly calls 
"Actually Existing Islam" (by which he means "the political and 
priestly power structure that presently dominates and stifles 
Musl im societies") with the uncertainties governing the circum-
stances under which the Qu ' ran came into existence (Imaginary 
Homelands 4 3 6 ) . The original verbal battle between Muhammad 
and the poets who defended the polytheism he set out to replace, 
which is reenacted in Rushdie's fictional reconstruction of it, has 
since been replayed—verbally—between its author and the 
mullahs. Islamic fundamentalism squares off against Islamic sec-
ularism (Rushdie was brought up in a Mus l im family where, 
however, "there was an absolute willingness to discuss anything." 
Appignanesi 3 0 ) . As Aamir Mufti has put it, "in secularizing (and 
hence profaning) the sacred 'tropology' of Islam by insisting 
upon its appropriation for the purposes of fiction, the novel 
throws into doubt the discursive edifice within which Islam has 
been produced in recent years" ( 1 0 7 ) . In effect Rushdie chooses 
to oppose the anti-imperialist discursive formation of Islam by 
pitting against it the alternative discursive formation of imagina-
tive fiction. Rushdie seems to see in fictional discourse a neutral 
discursive space in which he can give free play to competing 
discourses that oppose both the discourse of Islam and that of 
Thatcherite nationalism. The Satanic Verses, then, can be seen as a 
bricolage of conflicting discourses framed by the controll ing 
discourse of fiction. But just how neutral is a discourse that 
controls? In its postmodern form is not fictional discourse itself 
competing for dominance with the other discursive formations it 
seeks to incorporate within its all-embracing grasp? 
The use of discursive formations, according to Miche l 
Foucault, represents an attempt to control and contain the 
"barely imaginable powers and dangers," the "ponderous, awe-
some materiality" of language (Archaeology/Discourse 2 i 6 ) . M 
Within The Satanic Verses, Rushdie pits secular against sacred, 
nationalist or racist against transnationalist or migrant, historical 
against ahistorical, and above all, authoritative against fictional 
forms of discourse. I want to concentrate on Rushdie's attempt to 
use fictional discourse to undermine the totalizing discourses of 
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religion and nationalism. To undermine is not necessarily to 
destroy. Rushdie has said that the novel is an exploration of 
the "God-shaped hole" left in h im after he had abandoned 
the "unarguable absolutes of rel igion" (Appignanesi 75). Apart 
from a brief moment of reverse apostasy during the period of the 
fatwa, he has remained a secular Mus l im who has always aspired 
to achieve within an aesthetic context that transcendence experi-
enced by the religious mystic. H e maintains that art, like religion, 
can produce a "flight of the human spirit outside the confines 
of its material, physical existence" (Imaginary Homelands 4 2 1 ) . 
Clearly the danger for someone holding this belief is that he will 
treat art or fiction as a transcendental signifier. Like many writers 
of the twentieth century, he is looking for an alternative religious 
experience outside the restrictive confines of an organized reli-
gion such as that of Islam (which literally means "Submission"). 
He would claim that, unlike Islamic funadamentalists, he does 
not seek to compel anyone to accept his aesthetic ideology. 
Nevertheless he clearly believes that this ideology is superior to 
that of either the fundamentalists or the imperialists. H e has no 
wish to compel, but a strong wish to persuade. 
This still leaves open to question why Rushdie should think 
that the discourse of art or fiction should have a truth-value 
unavailable to revealed religion. Can there be a hierarchy of 
discourses? Accord ing to Foucault all discourses are subject to 
their own particular confining sets of rules. If this is the case, why 
should the discourses of fundamentalist religion and national-
ism find Rushdie's use of fictional discourse in The Satanic Verses 
so threatening? Is it because fiction claims to incorporate those 
other discursive formations within its own discourse and in doing 
so to reveal the will to power underlying their will to truth? (But 
doesn't the Qu ' ran do the same thing in its treatment of contem-
porary poets?) Foucault identifies the will to truth as the most 
important of the three systems of exclusion that govern dis-
course. H e claims that it has tended to assimilate the other two 
systems—prohibited words, and the division between reason 
and folly. Each discursive formation claims for itself the status of 
"true" discourse, concealing behind its will to constitute the truth 
of things its desire for power. This is obviously the case in the 
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instance of a theocratic state such as Iran where Islamic faith (of 
the Shi'ite variety) is invoked to justify a war against even fellow 
(Sunni) Muslims of a neighboring state such as Iraq. By call ing it 
a jihad or holy war, by definition a war waged against infidels, 
such a state draws on the discourse of "true" religion to sanction 
its naked nationalist and political ambitions. In a similar fashion 
Mrs. Thatcher appealed to the "truth" of the rights to self-
determination by the Falkland Islanders to sanction her desire to 
retain political power back in the metropolitan center. 
But Foucault insists that the same great systems of exclusion 
govern the discourse of literature. Literature too feels that it 
has to extend its power over its readers by claiming truth for 
itself. Accord ing to Foucault, "Western literature has, for centu-
ries, sought to base itself in nature, in the plausible, upon sin-
cerity and science—in short, upon true discourse" (Archaeology/ 
Discourse 2 1 9 ) . One might argue that what is loosely referred to 
as postmodern literature does anything but base itself on nature. 
As M i m i insists in the novel: " I . . . am conversant with postmoder-
nist critiques of the West, for example, that we have here a society 
capable only of pastiche: a 'flattened' world" ( 2 6 1 ) . Rushdie has 
obviously read his Jameson. 4 Yet when Rushdie comes to defend 
fiction in his own person he claims that postmodern writing 
offers the truest reflection of contemporary human experience: 
a "rejection of totalized explanations is the modern condit ion. 
A n d this is where the novel, the form created to discuss the 
fragmentation of truth, comes in . . . . The elevation of the 
quest for the Grai l over the Grai l itself, the acceptance that all 
that is solid has melted into air, that reality and morality are not 
givens but imperfect human constructs, is the point from which 
fiction begins" (Imaginary Homelands 4 2 2 ) . This comes close to 
basing fiction in nature by redefining the natural. Rushdie is 
unashamedly pitting his naturalized fictional discourse against 
what he terms (with an acknowledgment to Lyotard) the unnatu-
ral, totalizing discourses of religion and national politics. As 
Foucault suggests, the will to truth "tends to exercise a sort of 
pressure, a power of constraint upon other forms of discourse" 
(Archaeology/Discourse 2 1 9 ) . 
In effect Rushdie claims for fictional discourse an imaginative 
form of truth where freedom reigns in place of institutional 
D E M O N I Z I N G D I S C O U R S E I N S A L M A N R U S H D I E 73 
control. Fiction, he maintains, can flout the mundane facts and 
still appeal to the world of the imagination to claim that it 
represents the "true" or authentic transcription of human expe-
rience. In "Imaginary Homelands," he argues that "[wjriters and 
politicians are natural rivals. Both groups try to make the world 
in their own images; they fight for the same territory. A n d the 
novel is one way of denying the official, politicians' version of the 
truth" (14). Rushdie's figurative allusions here are revealing. 
While he is ostensibly arguing about claims to truthfulness, his 
vocabulary ("rivals," "fight," "territory") belongs to the the world 
of power. 
In the opening chapter of the novel, Rushdie forces his 
readers to become conscious of the paradoxical nature of fic-
tion's notion of "true" discourse: "Once upon a time—itwas and 
it was not so, as the o ld stories used to say, it happened and it never 
did—maybe, then, or maybe not" (35). A l l fictional discourse is 
predicated by that "maybe." It is for the reader to decide on the 
probability of the imaginative construct. The Satanic Verses begins 
by flouting any sense of factual reality with an impossible rebirth 
— two actors (as the two main protagonists are tellingly charac-
terized) falling to earth without parachutes or wings from a 
height of 29 ,000 feet. Other improbabilities follow. Gibreel ac-
quires a halo and Chamcha goat hooves and horns. A dead lover 
visits Gibreel on a magic carpet. Gibreel tropicalizes London's 
climate. The British authorities turn immigrants into a water-
buffalo, slippery snakes and a manticore, itself a beast of fictional 
invention. In effect Rushdie is exploiting the extended bound-
aries of fictional discourse to demonstrate that what is invented is 
not necessarily untrue i f read figuratively. When Chamcha asks 
the manticore how "they" manage to turn the immigrants into 
such weird creatures, he promptly replies, "They have the power 
of description, and we succumb to the pictures they construct" 
( 168). But the novelist, Rushdie goes on to imply, has a superior 
power of description, which should enable h im to overpower the 
descriptive discourse of the racist immigration authorities. Like 
the novelist, these authorities make the "story" they concoct 
about how Chamcha came to be unconscious (mainly due to the 
beating they gave him) "more convincing" by incorporating into 
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their fiction the fact that he was at any rate genuinely sick 
beforehand (169). Rushdie parodies their method of telling a 
story by starting off as they do with a fiction, such as the man-
ticore, and then offering—not facts, but a figurative explanation 
for the seemingly unreal shapes they assume. 
Interspersed with the "realist" chapters are chaoters in which 
Gibreel is visited by unwanted dreams or nightmares. Paradox-
ically, within his surreal world of dreams Gibreel becomes the 
spectator or participant in a series of historically authenticated 
occurrences (suggesting that history itself is a collective dream-
ing about the past). His dream of Mahound (the Christian 
crusaders' demonic term of abuse for Muhammad) incorporates 
numerous incidents from accounts of the life of Muhammad. 
Similarly the story of Ayesha makes free use of a widely reported 
episode that happened in Karachi in 1983 when Naseem Fatima 
led thirty eight Shi 'a followers into the sea which they expected 
to part for them. Another narrative strand in Gibreel's dream 
chapters—the account of the Imam's return from exile — 
resembles the Ayatollah Khomeini 's return to Iran on the down-
fall of the Shah in 1979. 
Gibreel is torn between a "real" world where the miraculous 
happens and a world of dreams where the miraculous is restored 
to an imagined but largely verifiable historical past. As Gibreel 
gradually drifts into a state of schizophrenia Rushdie further 
complicates the already confused distinction between material 
and imaginative reality by showing the barrier between waking 
and dreaming worlds slowly crumbling. Neither Gibreel nor the 
reader can be sure of where one world ends and the other begins. 
The resulting confusion can be either liberating or destructive. 
"The imagination," Rushdie admits, "can falsify, demean, ridi-
cule, caricature and wound as effectively as it can clarify, intensify 
and unveil" (Imaginary Homelands 143). O n the other hand, 
Rushdie reveals his own prejudice when he inconsistently insists 
that "the opposition of imagination to reality . . . reminds us that 
we are not helpless; that to dream is to have power." Here again 
we glimpse the will to power underlying fiction's will to (imagina-
tive) truth. Rushdie continues: "Unreality is the only weapon 
with which reality can be smashed, so that it may subsequently be 
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reconstituted" (Imaginary Homelands 122). But what does he 
mean by "reality"? Apparently "our conventional, habit-dulled 
certainties about what the world is and has to be," a world "in 
which things inevitably get worse" (122). The dream worlds of 
the artist have "the power . . . to oppose this dark reality" ( 12 2 ). 
Their (postmodern) plurality, Rushdie asserts, brings the light of 
truth to a world benighted by the unitary truths of politics and 
religion. But the discourse of fiction is seen here to be as incapa-
ble as is all true discourse, according to Foucault, "of recognizing 
the will to truth which pervades it" (Archaeology/Discourse 219) . It 
is as b l ind to its determination to establish its superior status as 
are the discursive formations of nationalism and Islam that it 
subordinates to its purposes. Discourse, like knowledge, is neces-
sarily contaminated by its desire to dominate. 
How does fictional discourse exercise its power of constraint 
on those totalizing discourses it opposes? Primarily by appropria-
tion. It incorporates them into its own discourse, one which 
ostensibly throws all proclaimed truths into question. Whereas 
Muslims believe that the archangel Gabriel dictated God's verses 
to Muhammad, Mahound, in Rushdie's subversive version of 
the origins of the Qu ' ran , exercises a form of telepathy by 
means of which he mesmerizes Gibreel into dictating what he 
(Mahound) needs from him. In other words Rushdie replaces 
the unauthored word of G o d by the psychologized interaction 
between the needful Prophet and his supposedly angelic mouth-
piece—an internal projection. Since Gibreel is responsible for 
uttering under Mahound's spell both the Satanic verses and their 
angelic rebuttal, the fictional discourse places h im in a position 
to throw doubt on Mahound's claim that the first set of verses 
came from Satan: 
Being God's postman is no fun, yar. 
Butbutbut: God isn't in this picture. 
God knows whose postman I've been. ( 1 1 2 ) 
Cast in fictional discursive form and undermined by Rushdie's 
use of a playful, punning tone, the absolutes of Islamic faith 
become humanized and relativized. The mere substitution of 
"postman" for "Messenger" reduces the sublime to the mun-
dane. Rushdie repeatedly exploits the polysemantic nature of 
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language to make us conscious of the possibility of alternative 
readings that were present at the moment that the discourse of 
Islam privileged one of them for its own use. For instance, Boston, 
one of the two gardens of paradise, is also the name of the plane 
which is blown up by Sikh terrorists in the opening chapter of the 
book. Paradise, then, within a framework of fictional discourse, 
offers no haven from the uncertainties of this world. The sight 
of perfection that Al l ie Cone glimpsed on Mount Everest is seen 
by this representative figure of the postmodern world to be 
unattainable in the here and now. Perfection entails absolute 
silence, according to Al l i e : "why speak if you can't manage per-
fect thoughts, perfect sentences" ( 2 9 6 ) ? Entry into the world of 
language, as the writer of fiction knows, entails the compromises 
and ambiguities that accompany imperfection, a fact that the 
believers in scripture deny. Within Rushdie's fictional universe 
most certainties (especially those consolatory absolutes held by 
religion) crumble. Uncertainty is the only unchanging certainty 
that Rushdie perversely posits in the novel. 
Within his own discourse Rushdie performs what Foucault 
terms a genealogical analysis on the discourse of Islam. Such an 
analysis involves investigating how that discourse was formed, 
what were its norms, and what were the conditions for its appear-
ance, growth and variation (Archaeology/Discourse 2 3 1 - 3 2 ) . In-
deed it is precisely this interest in what Foucault terms genealogy 
that predominates in this novel: 
How does newness come into the world? How is it bom? 
Of what fusions, translations, conjoinings is it made? (8) 
Mahound's discourse is founded on the insistence that there is 
only one God. He imposes this monotheistic idea on the people 
ofjahilia (meaning the period of ignorance prior to the advent 
of Islam), themselves polytheists who have constructed their city 
out of the shifting sands of the desert. Mahound's insistence on 
repetitive ritual washing is itself a threat to the survival of their 
multifold structures built of dry sand, as well as offering a para-
digm of the difference in their ideological positions. The Jahil ian 
polytheists (like contemporary postmodernists) can accept 
a greater degree of linguistic discontinuity in their belief in 
gods with overlapping powers and domains than can Mahound, 
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who belongs to what Foucault terms the "'critical ' group" which 
imposes "forms of exclusion, limitation, and appropriation" on 
the threatening linguistic universe (Archaeology/Discourse 231). 
Mahound's t r iumph represents the imposition of a unitary belief 
system on a society that resembled India where "the human 
population outnumbers the divine by less than three to one" 
(16). Here Rushdie combines a postcolonial admiration for 
Indian diversity with a Western postmodern endorsement of the 
polysemantic nature of language. But he seems to forget that 
diversity can be (and was in the case of the British Empire) used 
to divide and rule. 
What also emerges from Rushdie's fictional historicization of 
the origins of Islam is that Mahound began life as a successful 
businessman (as Muhammad did) and subsequently used the 
new religion to consolidate in business-like fashion his secular 
hold on power. Mahound moves from the will to power to the will 
to truth which soon enough reveals the underlying will to power 
that resurfaces as the religious metamorphosizes into the politi-
cal. Mahound is also l ikened to Ibrahim (Abraham), who at 
God's command abandoned his wife in the desert. The narrator 
comments, "From the beginning men used G o d to justify the 
unjustifiable" (95). Such an aside implicit ly opposes a different 
discourse (humanism? feminism?) to that of religion. But simul-
taneously it gives narratorial approval to the opposing discourse, 
which defeats the ostensible postmodern stance of universal 
doubt. The context suggests that the primary discourse invoked 
is that of feminism. M u c h is made of Mahound's imposition of a 
maximum of four wives on his followers while permitting himself 
twelve. In a section of the novel that particularly inflamed Mus-
lims Rushdie parodies Mahound's household by inventing the 
brothel in which Baal the poet (representative of the discourse of 
literature) parallels Mahound, and the twelve prostitutes he 
marries take on the names of the Prophet's twelve wives. Sacred 
(that is, divinely condoned) and secular sexuality, like sacred 
and secular verbal creativity, are made to appear virtually identi-
cal in a fictional context. The distinctions that define Islamic 
discourse (Foucault's external rules of exclusion) are subtly 
elided until that discourse merges into the discourse of fiction 
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where it becomes just another imaginative textual construct. In 
this instance Rushdie is more successful in undermining a uni-
tary discourse by placing it in a discursive context that deliber-
ately equates sacred and secular through the use of literary 
parallelism. 
Rushdie has a more difficult task attempting a genealogical 
analysis of the discourse of nationalism, i f only because the 
formation of nations predates recorded history. In the case of 
Britain he chooses instead to invoke the Norman conquest of 
1066 (an event used by English historians to mark the beginning 
of the Middle Ages) by having Gibreel and Chamcha fall to earth 
at Hastings, the site of the battle in which Wil l iam the Conqueror 
defeated Haro ld and replaced Anglo-Saxon civilization with a 
new regime. Just as Wi l l iam swallowed a mouthful of sand on 
landing at Hastings, Gibreel swallows a mouthful of snow, while 
Chamcha had already been forced to swallow a kipper, bones and 
all, "the first step in his conquest of England" (44). The nar-
rative reminds us from the start that Britain is the product of 
countless invasions each of which has put new blood into its 
system. Gibreel invokes another royal foreigner, Wi l l i am of 
Orange, whose bloodless revolution in 1688 brought with it 
an influx of new ideas from the Continent. Gibreel reflects, "Not 
all migrants are powerless. . . . They impose their needs on 
their new earth, br inging their own coherence to the new-found 
land, imagining it afresh" (458). The newest conquerors are 
immigrants from the West Indies and the Indian subcontinent. 
Conquest, however, is not without its dangers. Both Williams died 
of unnatural causes—Rushdie refers in the novel to the later 
Will iam's death from falling off his horse onto the hard earth 
he 'd civilized. Similarly one of the two migrant protagonists and 
other immigrant characters in the novel meet unnatural deaths, 
some at the hands of the xenophobic British authorities who 
remain b l ind to their own mixed racial origins. 
Margaret Thatcher, who had been in power for over nine years 
by the time the novel was published, comes in for harsher treat-
ment than does Mahound, being referred to as "Torture. Maggie 
the Bitch" (269). Rushdie had been particularly enraged by a 
speech she had made after Britain's victory against Argentina in 
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the Falkland Islands (Las Malvinas) in which she "most plainly 
nailed her colours to the old colonial mast, claiming that the 
success in the South Atlantic proved that the British were still the 
people 'who had mied a quarter of the world ' " (Imaginary Home-
lands 92). Unconsciously she was betraying the fact that she did 
not consider immigrants like Rushdie who had come from the 
ruled quarter to be a true part of the national identity. Rushdie 
goes further, arguing that "the British authorities, no longer 
capable of exporting governments, have chosen instead to im-
port a new Empire , a new community of subject peoples," refer-
ring to the post war immigration from the Caribbean (Imaginary 
Homelands 130). It is this attempt to reverse the course of history 
that enables Rushdie to establish a l ink between Mrs. Thatcher 
and the Imam, the contemporary representative of Islamic fun-
damentalism. When Mrs. Thatcher called for a return to Victo-
rian values, Rushdie wrote, "she had embarked on a heroic battle 
against the linear passage of Time" (Imaginary Homelands 92). In 
the novel, Valance makes the same point more colorfully to a 
disconcerted Chamcha. The connection to the Imam becomes 
clear when the Imam tells an equally disconcerted Gibreel that 
he will smash all the clocks when he comes to power in the name 
of God's "boundless time, that encompasses past, present and 
future; the timeless time, that has no need to move." "I am 
eternity," he asserts ( 214) . Whereas Lyotard and FredricJameson 
both claim in their way that the postmodern entails a denial of 
the forces of history, Rushdie's satire at the expense of these two 
modern leaders who have set out to reverse the chronological 
progression of time emanates more from his postcolonial belief 
in the need to acknowledge the historical effects of imperialism 
if these are to be overturned and left behind by the newly 
liberated peoples of the o ld empires. The truly postmodern 
response to Mrs. Thatcher's and the Imam's reversal of historical 
time would be to allow temporal and atemporal forces equal play. 
Instead Rushdie attempts to subvert the uncreated word of 
God by rehistoricizing the origins of Islam (just as he under-
mines the Thatcher regime's desire to return to the Victorian 
days of Empire by staging a race riot that is representative of 
contemporary immigrants' militant rejection of the ideology of 
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imperialism). He does this by turning to a distinctive characteris-
tic of literary discourse — literary f o r m — i n order to subvert the 
claims to truth of Islamic discourse. H e employs a form that 
begins by attempting to distinguish through alternating chapters 
between the waking present-day "reality" of L o n d o n (and Bom-
bay) and Gibreel's dreams of his participation in phantasma-
goric historical events, and that deliberately engineers the 
collapse of that distinction as the fictionality of the controll ing 
literary discourse asserts itself. In framing history within a fic-
tional context this novel is not behaving like a typical post-
modern work of art in which, as Jameson puts it, "the past as 
'referent' finds itself gradually bracketed, and then effaced al-
together" (18). Rather, the mythologized past of the origins 
of Islam is given a sense of lived historical actuality by being 
dramatized within the novel; i n the process it is demystified and 
returned to the fallible world of human need and error. Simul-
taneously the fictionalized episodes involving Gibreel's and 
Chamcha's escapades in Ellowen Deeowen (itself a product of 
fiction, a child's nursery rhyme name for London) incorporate 
recognizable elements from contemporary history: references to 
Enoch Powell's famous prediction in a speech to the House of 
Commons in 196g that rivers of blood would flow if immigration 
to Britain were not severely restricted; recognition that Mrs. 
Thatcher was attempting "literally to invent a whole goddam new 
middle class in this country" (270); the easily identifiable L o n -
don ghetto of Brickhal l where the harassment of immigrants 
from the Indian subcontinent by police and white youths boils 
over into a full scale race riot. In these and other similar sections 
of the book contemporary reality constantly erupts into and 
disrupts the impression that we are occupying a world of pure 
imagination. This bricolage of historical and fictional compo-
nents is not available to the discourse of religion for which a 
condition of the discourse is that the truth be accepted as of 
divine origin. Whereas religion asserts the truth of its discourse 
(itself a will to power), postmodern fiction ostensibly questions 
all forms of truth—those of both historical fact and fictional 
invention. 
O r does it? Behind the postmodern pastiche artist cannot one 
discern the traditional writer as seer? However, instead of finding 
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truth in long established shared verities, Rushdie privileges a 
non-totalized, pluralistic, open-ended form of discourse that 
coincides with postmodern writing practices. Truth-value in his 
view is multiple and conflicting; it comes closer in definition to 
the satisfactoriness of belief favored by pragmatic philosophers. 
But the will to truth persists. A radical postmodern stance, on the 
other hand, would proclaim the inaccessibility of truth and con-
fine itself to undermining all claims to absolute truth by and in 
discourse. Rushdie's position entails an assumption of superi-
ority over those claiming to represent the truth by demonstrating 
the impossibility of doing so. Yet Rushdie implicit ly elevates the 
multiple and conflictual nature of fictional discourse to a posi-
tion of higher "truth." The very fact that it can incorporate the 
truth of religion into its manifold discourse—and The Satanic 
Verses certainly accomplishes this—is intended to show the supe-
riority of plural fictional discourse to the unitary discourse of 
Islam. But, as Sara Suleri has acutely pointed out, "the desacriliz-
ing [sic] of religion" in The Satanic Verses "can simultaneously 
constitute a resacrilizing of history" ( 190). Even history, however, 
is subordinated in the novel to the playful and irresistible powers 
of the artistic imagination. A n d , despite Rushdie's assertions to 
the contrary, the imagination goes well beyond the raising of 
questions in Rushdie's fiction. He tends to say one thing while 
accomplishing another. "Answers are cheap. Questions are hard 
to find," he asserted on the occasion of his emergence from 
hiding in September 1995 to talk about his latest novel, The 
Moor's Last Sigh (Montalbano E7) . Yet the new novel shows h im 
once again implicit ly going beyond mere questions when deplor-
ing "the tragedy of multiplicity destroyed by singularity, the 
defeat of Many by One" (Wood 3). Why the insistence on binary 
polarity? What is wrong, for instance, with the One and the 
Many? Is this not the more genuine postmodern alternative to 
the exclusivity of the One? 
Another characteristic of fictional discourse which Rushdie 
uses to subvert the truth claims of other unitary discourses is 
its ability to exploit a disparity between tone and substance. 
Having already written one comic epic {Midnight's Children), 
Rushdie considered The Satanic Verses the most comic of his 
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first four novels (Jain 99). By "comedy" he understands "black 
comedy" "that doesn't always make you laugh" (Haffenden 2 4 0 ) . 
Black comedy, which applies a comic tone to serious, even tragic 
subject matter, is a mode that in its written form is largely appro-
priated by literature. It is much used by postmodern writers con-
fronted with a world on the brink of self-annihilation. Rushdie 
makes skillful use of this mode to undercut the serious tone 
which religious and political discourse employs most of the time. 
As the narrator says at one point, all he can offer in place of 
tragedy is the echo of it, a "burlesque for our degraded, imitative 
times, in which clowns re-enact what was first done by heroes and 
kings" ( 4 2 4 ) . So heroes of the past (like Muhammad) are trans-
formed into burlesque images (like Mahound) of their heroic 
models in this contemporary retelling of their stories. 
Rushdie's use of black comedy is particularly evident in the 
passages concerning politics, capitalist greed and racism, all of 
which tend to mutually support one another's rhetoric. The 
epitome of this ethos is a minor character in the book, H a l 
Valance, an advertising executive who used to employ Chamcha 
for the voice-overs in his commercials. His hero is Deep Throat, 
who advised Bob Woodward: follow the money. H a l takes this 
advice to heart. Over lunch he confides to Chamcha: 
"I . . . love this fucking country. That's why I'm going to sell it to 
the whole goddamn world, Japan, America, fucking Argentina. I'm 
going to sell the arse off it. That's what I've been selling all my fucking 
life: the fucking nation. The flag." ( 2 6 8 ) 
H a l uses market research to justify removing all signs of 
black immigrants from his commercials, ending up by sacking 
Chamcha for being "a person of the tinted persuasion" ( 2 6 7 ) . 
His justification: "ethnics don't watch ethnic shows" ( 2 6 5 ) . 
Chamcha's media image is "just too damn racial" ( 2 6 5 ) . (It 
is interesting that most of Hal 's racial prejudices echo actual 
instances of racism that Rushdie records encountering while 
working for the advertising industry; see Imaginary Homelands 
136-37.) H a l has no compunction about projecting his racism 
onto the immigrant community by accusing Chamcha of being 
too alien even for his fellow immigrants (for the "ethnic uni-
verse" as H a l puts it in his execrable commercialized jargon). 
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Political opposition to Hal 's television show in which Chamcha 
starred comes from a black activist, Dr. U h u m Simba. The police 
claim that, while under arrest, he fell off the lower of two bunks in 
his cell on waking up from a nightmare and broke his neck 
falling to the floor. The absurd improbability of this explanation 
is typical of the way Rushdie employs black humor to expose the 
repeated instances of racial bias offered during the eighties by 
the British police, who habitually employed a quasi-legal termi-
nology (such as is used by the Community Relations Officer in 
the book) to lie their way out of their illegal actions. It is interest-
ing to reflect that the reality of the lies told in court by the police 
during the prosecution of the Birmingham Five (or by Mark 
Fuhrman during the O . J . Simpson trial) was actually more 
subversive of socialjustice than the hilarious and absurd explana-
tions offered in Rushdie's novel for the death in ja i l of Dr. Simba. 
The exposure effected by the supposedly superior discourse of 
fiction is less credible, i f more enjoyable, than the simultaneous 
press exposure of police perjury by the supposedly inferior dis-
course of the media. Comedy, in this case black comedy, may 
expose the hypocrisies of those in authority, but cannot and does 
not attempt to affect the course of social history in the way that 
more utilitarian discourses can and do. In his role as a post-
modern writer, Rushdie, in "bracketing off the real social world," 
(as Terry Eagleton writes of all postmodernists) "must simul-
taneously bracket off the political forces which seek to transform 
that order" (67-68). 
The feature of fictional discourse that, it is claimed, distin-
guishes it from all other discourses is its unique and special use of 
language. Ever since the Russian Formalists argued that literary 
language defamiliarizes "everyday" language (but which? and 
whose?), there seems to have been general agreement that the 
discourse of fiction has at its disposal uses of language that other 
discourses may borrow but do not deploy systematically. If one 
accepts Foucault's assertion that discursive formations are gov-
erned by internal and external thresholds and limits "to master 
and control the great proliferation of discourse, in such a way as 
to relieve its richness of its most dangerous elements" and "to 
organize its disorder so as to skate round its most uncontrollable 
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aspects" (Archaeology/Discourse 228), then the question arises 
whether literature is privileged above other forms of discourse 
because it allows within its borders more of the dangers and 
disorder of uncontrolled discourse, ostensible chains of signi-
fiers refusing all semblance of closure. Foucault at times suggests 
as much, as when he writes, for instance, that "literature's task is 
to say the most unsayable — the worst, the most secret, the most 
intolerable, the shameless" (Power, Truth, Strategy 91 ). Surely this 
is just what The Satanic Verses is doing? In a key essay, "Is Nothing 
Sacred?" Rushdie claims that one way in which his use of literary 
language acts in just this fashion is by undermining the mono-
logic discourse of religion: "whereas religion seeks to privilege 
one language above all others, one text above all others, one set 
of values above all others, the novel has always been about the 
way in which different languages, values and narratives quarrel, 
and about the shifting relations between them, which are rela-
tions of power" (Imaginary Homelands 420) . If Rushdie begins to 
sound like Foucault here this may be because he has read h im 
and goes on in the essay to quote extensively from his "What Is 
an Author?" 5 It is significant, however, that neither Foucault 
nor Rushdie are entirely consistent in their claim to see in lit-
erary discourse a (negative) superiority over rival discursive 
formations. 
By placing the monologic discourses of Islam and of national-
ism within the polyglossic and heteroglossic discourse of fiction, 
Rushdie is able to d é c e n t r e them and reveal the self interest that 
lies behind all special uses of language—except that of fiction to 
which he remains largely b l ind . Rushdie is extremely adept at 
using literary language to expose the polysemantic nature of 
terminology given a unitary (or, as Bakhtin would say, a centripe-
tal) interpretation by the forces of authority. His sheer linguistic 
inventiveness produces neologisms whose uncomfortable con-
junctions expose the contradictions inherent in the original 
word—"Bungledish" and "BabyLondon" come to mind. With 
one inventive word combination, L o n d o n , the imperial center, 
the epitome of wealth and power, that held its colonial peoples in 
captivity as Nebuchadnezzar d id the Jews, is by verbal association 
made to share the downfall of Babylon and become "the habita-
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tion of devils" (Rev. 18.2). Similarly he strings words together the 
effect of which is to undermine the conventional distinction 
between them: "angelicdevilish," or "information/inspiration." 
Another linguistic feature that enables Rushdie to make seem-
ingly impossible connections in this particular novel is his multi-
ple use of the same proper names. He takes from Islamic history 
Ayesha, the name of the Prophet's favorite wife, and uses the 
same name for the most popular of the prostitutes in the Jahi l ia 
brothel, for the Mus l im visionary who led her fellow villagers to 
drown in the sea, and for one of the girl prostitutes in London . 
Sacred and profane versions of womanhood become fused and 
indistinguishable by this linguistic sleight of hand. Whereas all 
the Ayeshas exist in Gibreel's dreams, the name of Gibreel's 
lover, Al le lu ia Cone, who belongs to the waking world, becomes 
metamorphosed via her nickname, Al l i e , to Al-Lat, the goddess 
denounced by Mahound, and to Mount Cone (the equivalent to 
Mount H i r a in Islamic tradition) which Mahound ascends to 
receive the words of Al l ah , both of which feature in Gibreel's 
dream world. In this instance Rushdie is using language to 
reinforce the lack of distinction between material and imagina-
tive worlds. Many other characters share their name with charac-
ters who belong to a different narrative sequence, such as Mishal, 
H i n d , and Salman, Mahound's scribe, who bears the same name 
as the author. Salman, when he starts deliberately mistranscrib-
ing Mahound's dictation, discovers that his "poor words could 
not be distinguished from the Revelation by God's own Messen-
ger" (367). Rushdie's mischievous use of his own name for this 
character cannot help privileging Salman's subversive discourse 
in which the natural slippage of language undermines the divine 
status of the Q'uran. Is this deliberate on Rushdie's part?—an 
attempt to escape from his own logocentrism by acknowledging 
it? O r is he once again giving narrative sanction to the superior 
status of literary discourse? 
Rushdie repeatedly dramatizes the heteroglossic quarrel be-
tween languages that he, like Bakhtin, considers the special 
province of fictional discourse. Heteroglossia, according to 
Bakhtin, is "another's speech in another's language . . . a special type 
of double-voiced discourse" (324). O n two occasions Rushdie pits a 
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poet's linguistic dexterity against the thunderings of, respec-
tively, a politician and a prophet. Enoch Powell's racist speech 
threatening rivers of b lood is appropriated by the immigrant 
Jumpy Joshi as the title and subject for a poem in which the river 
of b lood of the slain is transformed into the river of blood of 
humanity in all its variety: "Reclaim the metaphor, Jumpy Joshi 
had told himself. Turn it; make it a thing we can use" (186). The 
second instance involves the linguistic battle between Baal, the 
satirical poet, and Mahound who stands opposed to all poets and 
poetry. Baal pits his poetic satires against Mahound's Recitation. 
The role of the poet, Baal declares, echoing Foucault, is to "name 
the unnamable, to point at frauds, to take sides, start arguments, 
shape the world and stop it going to sleep" (97). Words, it 
turns out, can be mortal (as Rushdie knows to his cost). When 
Mahound finally has Baal in his power he orders h im and the 
twelve prostitutes he married to be executed. "Whores and 
writers, Mahound," Baal shouts as he is dragged away. "We are the 
people you can't forgive." T o which Mahound replies, "Writers 
and whores. I see no difference" (392). The grand narrative of 
religion can only see the plural and contradictory discourse of 
literature, what Rushdie has called "the schismatic Other of the 
sacred (and authorless) text," as a prostitution of the one truth 
(Imaginary Homelands 424). But doesn't the decentered dis-
course of postmodern literature equally see the grand narrative 
of religion as a prostitution of the truth? Why does its plurality 
and fragmentation make it preferable to a unitary master narra-
tive? Different, yes. More comprehensive, because less insistent 
on the unitary nature of tnith, maybe. But superior? It still 
betrays the same will to power as those grand narratives that it 
despises. 
Al though Foucault at times appears to suggest that fictional 
discourse enjoys some exemption from the limitations governing 
other discursive formations, in "The Discourse of Language," he 
treats literary discourse as an exemplary case when out l ining the 
program for a critical (as opposed to a genealogical) analysis of 
discourse. Critical analysis involves identifying the forms of ex-
clusion, limitation and appropriation that enable us "to conceive 
discourse as a violence that we do things, or, at all events, as 
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a practice we impose upon them" (Archaeology/Discourse 229). 
Rushdie sees fictional discourse as an opportunity to counter 
"false" narratives, such as that of national politics, with the sup-
posedly superior truth-value of imaginative literature. "I think it 
is a curious phenomenon of the twentieth century," Rushdie has 
said, "that politicians have got very good at inventing fictions 
which they tell us as the truth. It then becomes the job of the 
makers of fiction to start telling the (real) truth" (Interview, 
B B C ) . Whether the "(real)" is Rushdie's or Malise Ruthven's 
explanatory addition when she transcribed this excerpt, the 
claim to have access to the truth (and what is an unreal truth?) 
reveals the contradiction that lies at the heart of Rushdie's fic-
tional polemic. The "real truth" is exactìy what every discourse 
aspires to embody, according to Foucault. In Foucaultian terms 
The Satanic Verses has the same truth-value as those discourses it 
sets out to undermine. Its author unabashedly asserts that its own 
set of truths consist of "hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the 
transformation that comes of new and unexpected combina-
tions of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs" 
(Imaginary Homelands 394)- Rushdie additionally claims that 
his use of non-naturalistic material in his books constitutes "a 
method of producing intensified images of reality" (Haffenden 
246). In privileging the non-naturalistic, is not Rushdie display-
ing his own discursive rules of exclusion, l imitation and appro-
priation that do as much violence to things as do discourses 
privileging the naturalistic? Certainly others have interpreted his 
use of magic realism in less positive ways. Sara Suleri, for in-
stance, felt that in Shame it represented a "startlingly conservative 
need to take refuge in formalism" (175). What appears to be a 
form of freedom in one discourse, that of literature, appears to 
be a sterile retreat within the context of another, that of liberal 
politics. 
Rushdie's stream of comments about the nature of his work 
falls under one of Foucault's internal, as opposed to external, set 
of rules whereby "discourse exercises its own control" (Archaeo-
logy/Discourse 220). Foucault's diagnosis of the function of com-
mentary is amusing, paradoxical and disturbing (for those of us 
engaged in the act of commentary). "Commentary," he writes, 
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"averts the chance element of discourse by giving it its due: it 
gives us the opportunity to say something other than the text 
itself, but on condit ion that it is the text itself which is uttered 
and, in some ways, finalized" (221). Commentary, in other 
words, is charged with restricting the potentiality of discourse 
to proliferate uncontrollably by the use of repetition. Very few 
other novels have generated the volume of commentary that The 
Satanic Verses has in the short period since it was published. Most 
of these commentaries have attempted to appropriate the book 
to a particular ideology—anti-Islamic, pro-Islamic, secular, post-
colonial, postmodern. By ignoring the totality of voices and 
discourses within the novel, they seek to fix its meaning within 
their particular discursive field. Rushdie's own voluminous com-
mentary focuses on the plurality of meanings that postmodern 
fiction nurtures and exploits. But he remains b l ind to the fact 
that the indeterminacy and universal doubt which his commen-
tary champions is frequently abandoned in the novel, not just 
when he assumes his post-colonial mantle, but also when satiriz-
ing the abuses of Islamic religion. Incidents such as the burning 
of the wax effigy of Mrs. Thatcher and the Imam's swallowing 
whole the armies of his supporters demonize the two leaders of 
racist nationalism and extreme Islamic militancy respectively in 
such a way as to leave little or no room for alternative readings. 
Rushdie might argue in his defence that he has also demonized 
his narrator, although his treatment of h im is more ambivalent— 
and therefore truer to the spirit of the postmodern — than is his 
representation of the two leaders. Often posing as the Devil, 
the narrator is careful to leave open the possibility that he 
may as readily represent "Ooparvala," the "Fellow Upstairs" as 
"Neechayvala," the "Guyfrom Underneath" (318). Undercover 
of this ambivalence the narrator in his own commentary on the 
action betrays a fundamental vacillation between a postmodern 
open-endedness and an older humanist defense of liberal values. 
But what of my own and similar instances of literary commen-
tary that focus on (and thereby implicit ly endorse) the novel's 
plurality of discourses, its multiplicity of voices, its postmodern 
resistance to totalizing explanations, positivist ideologies and 
narrative closure? Do not I have Rushdie's own commentaries as 
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a guarantee of authenticity? C o u l d not I argue that Rushdie and I 
in our commentaries are both opening up his fictional discourse, 
rather than circumscribing its fortuitousness, its propensity to 
semantically proliferate? After all the novel undermines not just 
Islamic fundamentalism but Christian fundamentalism (Eugene 
Dumsday, the American evangelist), not just British racism, but 
Indian racism (Hindu nationalism). It even makes fun of Baal, 
the representative of literary discourse within this literary dis-
course, Baal whose poems as he grows old degenerate into cele-
brations of loss. A n d yet does it really put down Baal's poetry? 
What form does his loss take? "It led h im to create chimeras 
of form, l ionheaded goatbodied serpenttailed impossibilities 
whose shapes felt obliged to change the moment they were set, so 
that the demotic forced its way into lines of classical purity and 
images of love were constantly degraded by the intrusion of 
elements of farce" (370). Is not this a description of Rushdie's 
own style of writing? Is not one of the features of postmodernism 
its conjunction of the demotic with the classical—what Jameson 
terms "aesthetic populism" (2)? Compared to the (modernist) 
clarity and finished quality of Mahound's verses, are not Baal's an 
anachronistic anticipation of postmodern literature? Does not 
Baal conveniently conform to Rushdie's definition of his own 
position within the contemporary literary universe? A n d do not 
Baal and Rushdie claim a privileged status for that position? A n d 
by writing this commentary am I not employing what Foucault 
calls "the infinite r ippl ing of commentary" in order "to say finally, 
what has silently been articulated deep down" (Archaeology/Dis-
course 221)? A m I not privileging those qualities of semantic 
plurality and endless signification that characterize his and other 
postmodern literary discourses at the expense of the monologic 
utterances of religious, political and other authorities? Bakhtin, 
on the other hand, insists that "[ljanguage . . . is never unitary" 
(288). He claims that "[e]very concrete utterance of a speaking 
subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal 
forces are brought to bear" (272). If The Satanic Verses is intent on 
exposing the centrifugal forces concealed within the discourses 
of politics and religion, then it would be appropriate for a 
commentator on the novel to concentrate on centripetal forces 
lurking behind its postmodern carnivalesque facade. 
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Instead, even the best commentators attempt to impose their 
own circumscription on the novel's polysemantic potential. 
H o m i Bhabha views Rushdie's contextualization of the Qu ' ran 
within the discourse of postmodern fiction that has brought on 
the charge of blasphemy: 
It is not that the "content" of the Koran is directly disputed; rather, by 
revealing other enunciatory positions and possibilities within the 
framework of Koranic reading, Rushdie performs the subversion of 
its authenticity by the act of cultural translation—he relocates the 
Koran's "intentionality" by repeating and reinscribing it in the locale 
of the novel of postwar cultural migrations and diasporas. ( 2 2 6 ) 
Bhabha is intent on revealing the impersonal operations of 
cultural translation. Blasphemy, he contends, constitutes "a mo-
ment when the subject-matter or the content of a cultural tradi-
tion is being overwhelmed or alienated, in the act of translation" 
(225). "Secular translation of the origins of Islam is itself 
the product of 'the disjunctive rewriting of the transculturai, 
migrant experience'" (226). Bhabha is clearly employing a post-
colonial critical perspective. So he is endorsing, by reinterpret-
ing, Rushdie's implici t ideological stance, on the grounds that it 
is representative of the way postcolonial newness makes its contri-
bution to the postmodern world. As Foucault ironically observes, 
"the novelty lies no longer in what is said, but in its reappearance" 
(221). The apparent openness of postmodernism to both or all 
sides of an argument seems calculated to invite readers and 
commentators (even Rushdie) alike to try to tie down and cir-
cumscribe the plurality of meanings playfully offered by the text. 
Foucault has not finished with me/us yet. Literary discourse, 
he argues, is also a prime example of a "fellowship of discourse" 
whose function is "to preserve or reproduce discourse, but 
in order that it should circulate within a closed community" 
[Archaeology/Discourse 225). Ridiculous, the reader wil l say; any-
one who wants to can read The Satanic Verses. But then we look at 
what happens to those who attempt to read it outside the literary 
fellowship. Enraged Muslims are reminded by those within the 
fellowship of literature that this is mere fiction. To read into a 
novel an act of blasphemy is to misunderstand the nature of 
fictional discourse. As Bil ly Batusta, the producer of a "theologi-
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cai" movie about the life of Muhammad says in the novel, when 
asked if it would not be seen as blasphemous, "Certainly not. 
Fiction is fiction; facts are facts" (272). Rushdie has echoed 
this argument privileging the literary reading over all others 
in his many commentaries defending the novel. So have most of 
the book's commentators. When Margaret Thatcher and her 
foreign secretary dared to apologize on behalf of the British 
nation for any offense the book might have caused and ex-
pressed a dislike of its contents, the Financial Times published a 
rebuke from within the literary community proclaiming that 
"they are wholly unqualified, in their capacity as elected politi-
cians, to have a useful opin ion" on matters of literary taste 
(Appignanesi 148)—a perfect instance of the operation of a 
fellowship of discourse claiming exclusive right to comment on 
one of its own productions. 
So where do I stand as a critic of this novel within the fellow-
ship of discourse? Should I, in typical poststructuralist fashion, 
explore the semantic multiplicity of this text, its inclusion of 
competing discursive formations, its selfconscious deconstruc-
tion of its apparent thematic position (s)? Yet is there not some-
thing hypocritical about this impersonal stance? Like Rushdie, I 
lost my religious faith long ago, and share with h im his dislike of 
religious dogmatism as well as his admiration for the state of 
transcendence that religion can produce. Like h im, I was politi-
cally opposed to the Thatcher government's implicitly racist 
attitudes while l iving in L o n d o n during her period in office. I 
have no patience with the concept of blasphemy (which inciden-
tally illustrates another of Foucault's rules determining condi-
tions under which discourse may be employed—ritual, which 
restricts who may even talk about the discursive content). A m I to 
pretend that I have no opinions of my own? Would not my 
readers and students simply lose patience with my liberal refusal 
to take sides? The appeal to plurality, with which much of the 
time I find myself in sympathy, seems to me totally inappropriate 
when faced with the need to take a unitary stand on subjects like 
the Thatcher government's immigration policy. 
Is not, then, what is missing in Rushdie's fiction any critique of 
the pluralist position he espouses in his fiction? In his commen-
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taries on the novel, he is prepared to adopt, as we have seen, a 
unitary (and superior) attitude to the dogma of Islamic funda-
mentalism and Thatcherite racism. What is missing is any recog-
nition on his part of this contradiction between his defence of his 
unitary stance as commentator of his own work and the creative 
plurality lying at the centre of his imaginative fiction. So there 
appears to be no escape from the blindnesses and limitations of 
discursive formations within which we operate. A l l I can do, and 
have done, is to make explicit the limitations of the literary 
discourses that on the one hand Rushdie and on the other hand I 
are working within. They are not superior to others. I choose to 
read and comment on fictional discourse finally because I per-
sonally feel more comfortable within it, because I like to enter 
that impossible world where writers name the unnamable, wTiere 
language is a tool of power, where dreams hold their own with 
material reality, and where as Blake wrote (whom Rushdie quotes 
in the novel) "a firm perswasion that a thing is so" will "make it so" 
(338). 6 
N O T E S 
1 Cf. "Art is a product of history, not a cause . . . so that the question of whether art 
should or should not be propaganda is unrea l . . . . If not a poem had been written, 
not a picture painted, not a bar of music composed, the history of man would be 
materially unchanged" (Auden 393). 
2 "I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives." "Postmodern knowl-
edge . . . refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate 
the incommensurable" (Jean-François Lyotard 38). 
3 Foucault makes a point of distinguishing discourse analysis from the history of 
ideas. Discursive formations consist of statements which, like equations and unlike 
sentences, are functional, and, like events, are material but incorporeal. A discur-
sive formation, Foucault asserts, "is made possible by a group of relations estab-
lished between authorities of emergence, delimitation, and specification." It is 
"defined (as far as its objects are concerned, at least) if one can establish such a 
group; if one can show how any particular object of discourse finds in it its place 
and law of emergence; if one can show that it may give birth simultaneously or 
successively to mutually exclusive objects, without having to modify itself (The 
Archaeology of Knowledge 4 4 ) . 
4 Rushdie is echoing Fredric Jameson's remarks in "The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism." There he refers to "the pastiche of the stereotypical past" which 
"endows present reality . . . with the spell and distance of a glossy mirage." He also 
identifies "the emergence of a new kind of flatness or depthlessness" as a distin-
guishing feature of postmodernism (Postmodernism 9). 
-r> In "The Discourse on Language," Foucault groups the use of the author (by which 
he means the unifying principle in any group of writings that guarantees their 
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coherence) within what he calls "principles of constraint," because, like commen-
tary and disciplines, the author principle limits the hazards of discourse. He had 
already offered a more elaborate explanation of the author as a function of 
discourse in his essay "What Is an Author?" (Language, Counter-Memory, Practice 
1 1 3 - 3 8 ) . 
6 I am indebted to Michael North for his helpful comments on an earlier version of 
this essay, which resulted in substantial alterations to it. 
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